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RESOLVING THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE EMPLOYER'S
DUTY TO BARGAIN ON THE BASIS OF AUTHORIZATION
CARDS: TRUCK DRIVERS UNION LOCAL NO. 413 v. NLRB
Although there is no explicit provision in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act' concerning the use of authorization cards2 as a means of select-
ing collective bargaining representatives,3 the courts repeatedly have
approved their use as a substitute for secret elections4 when there exists
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
2. For a detailed explanation of the procedural aspects of authorization card use,
see Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YA. LJ. 805, 807-19 (1966).
3. Section 9(c) (1) of the Act provides for the selection of bargaining representa-
tives upon the petition of an employer or employee for "an election by secret ballot."
29 U.S.C. 5 159(c) (1) (1970). Section 9(a), however, speaks in terms of "[r]epresen-
tatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining" (id. 5 159(a)),
and the Supreme Court has relied upon this language in holding that a union may
attain majority status without an election. United Mine Workers of America v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co, 351 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1956). See generally Lesnick, Estab-
lishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 Mic-. L. Rxv. 851,
861-62 (1967); Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority,
3 GA. L. REv. 349 (1969); Comment, Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable Basis
for an NLRB Order to Bargain?, 47 TExAS L. Rxv. 87 (1968).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); United Mine Workers
of America v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); NLRB v. Ozark Motor
Lines, 403 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Atco-Surgical Supports, Inc., 394 F.2d
659 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Elliot-Williams Co., 345 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, 300 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Philamon
Laboratories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Whitelight Prods. Div, 298
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951).
Although the use of authorization cards has been recognized as a valid alternative
to secret elections, it is evident that the NLRB prefers the latter method for the
selection of bargaining representatives. See, e.g., Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 62
L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966). In Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974) (Nos. 73-1231 &
73-1234), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged three
reasons for this preference, stating:
(1) There is greater opportunity for coercion of employees by union
organizers, as compared with a secret ballot. (2) Arguably, employees
may misunderstand the import of signing an authorization card, because of
misreading, failure to read, or union misrepresentation. (3) When cards
are used, the employer has no opportunity to speak to his employees con-
cerning their determination to have union representation, and an employer's
right to communicate to employees concerning representation is arguably
guaranteed under § 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Id. at 1107 (footnotes omitted).
Notwithstanding these negative considerations, the utility of authorization cards
has been recognized by the Supreme Court: "The acknowledged superiority of the
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"convincing evidence of majority support." 5 Attempts by the National
Labor Relations Board to establish a practicable test for determining
the circumstances under which an asserted card-based majority gives
rise to an employer duty to bargain, 6 however, have been fraught with
uncertainty and frequent reversals of position. The Court of Appeals
election process, however, does not mean that cards are thereby rendered totally in-
valid, for where an employer engages in conduct disruptive of the election process,
cards may be the most effective-perhaps the only-way of assuring employee choice."
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969). Indeed, it has been asserted
that rerun elections are ineffectual since they generally produce victory for the party
whose misconduct tainted the initial election. Pollitt, NLRB Rerun Elections: A
Study, 41 N.C.L. RLv. 209, 212 (1963).
5. Soon after passage of the National Labor Relations Act, it was held that an
employer may be required to bargain collectively when confronted with "convincing
evidence" of a union's majority support among employees within an appropriate bar-
gaining unit. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940);
NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1938). The requisite form
of such evidence, however, was never specified. Among the various indicia which
have been held sufficient to support a bargaining relationship are strike votes (CA.
Lund Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 423, 2 L.R.R.M. 170 (1938); Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B.
626, 1 L.R.R.M. 88 (1937)); union membership applications (NLRB v. Somerset Shoe
Co., Ill F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Louisville Refining Co, 102 F.2d 678
(6th Cir. 1939)); and acceptance of strike benefits (Rabhor Co, 1 N.L.R.B. 470, 1
L.R.R.M. 31 (1936)).
6. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29
US.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). The National Labor Relations Board is authorized "to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting com-
merce" (id. § 160(a)) and is specifically directed to "issue and cause to be served on
such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this
subchapter .... (id. § 160(c)). The Supreme Court has consistently held that prior
to issuance of a bargaining order, the Board must find that the petitioning union has
been properly "designated or selected" as the bargaining agent for a majority of
employees and that the employer's refusal to bargain with that representative violates
section 8(a)(5) of the Act. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969);
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
702 (1944); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942).
The ability of a union to obtain a bargaining order predicated on a card-based
majority was limited by a waiver rule announced in Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B.
1365, 35 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1954), the Board stating that a union with an authorization
card majority which proceeded to and lost an election in the face of employer pre-
election unfair labor practices could petition for a rerun election but had waived its
right to rely upon the authorization cards to obtain a bargaining order to redress the
employer's initial refusal to bargain. In 1964 the Board reversed Aiello, holding in
Bernel Foam Products, 146 N..R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964), that a union does
not waive its opportunity to proceed with a section 8(a) (5) hearing after an unsuc-
cessful attempt to attain majority status through the election process.
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for the District of Columbia Circuit, exasperated by the Board's erratic
administrative history, recently directed in Truck Drivers Union Local
No. 413 v. NLRB7 that the Board define precisely the test it intends to
apply in these situations. This Comment will trace the pendulating line
of decisions which have created the current problem, examine the ra-
tionale behind two conflicting proposals, and offer a compromised, yet
practical, solution supported by experience and cognizant of the needs
of employer and employee.
The fundamental defense of an employer to a charge of refusal to
bargain was enunciated by the Board in Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,8 in which
it was held that an employer may deny a bargaining request if it enter-
tains a "good faith doubt" concerning the status of the union as majority
representative of its employees. This clearly subjective test 9 was modi-
fied in 1966, the Board holding in Aaron Brothers'0 that its General
Counsel, rather than the employer, has the burden of establishing the
motivation behind a refusal to bargain.1 Concurring in the Board's
decision, Member Jenkins explained the reasons for this shift in the
burden of proof:
Thus, the concept of 'good-faith doubt of majority', whatever
its relevance in other types of Section 8(a) (5) violations, has be-
come irrelevant to the decision of cases ... where the employer
rejects the card showing but engages in no violations of the Act,
no undermining of the union, no interference with the employ-
ees' freedom of choice, and does not otherwise exhibit bad faith.
Retention of this concept in such cases can only confuse the
7. 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974)
(Nos. 73-1231 & 73-1234).
8. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). See, e.g., Traders Oil Co., 119 N.L.R.B.
746, 41 L.R.R.M. 1180 (1957); Harrisonburg Building Units Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 334,
38 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1956).
9. The potential subjectivity of the test may be observed in the Board's explanation
of its operation: "In cases of this type the question of whether an employer is acting
in good or bad faith at the time of the refusal is, of course, one which of necessity
must be determined in the light of all relevant facts in the case, including any unlawful
conduct of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the
refusal and the unlawful conduct." Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264, 24
L.R.R.M. 1548, 1550 (1949).
10. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966).
11. Id. at 1078-79, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161. See, e.g., H & W Construction Co., 161 N.L.R.B.




parties, the bar, and the Trial Examiner, and thereby increase the
Board's own work load.12
This decision effectively limited the use of authorization cards and
forced unions generally to seek to establish majority status through the
preferred electoral process.
Prior to the modification of the Joy Silk doctrine, the Board had held
in So7OW & Sons13 that a defense of good faith would be unavailing if it
could be established that an employer had refused to bargain while in
possession of actual knowledge of the union's majority status. The
finding of "independent knowledge" 14 in Snow & Sons was premised
upon the employer's voluntary agreement to have an autonomous third
party verify authorization cards and its continued refusal to bargain
once the cards had been verified. 15 The immediate effect of the Board's
decision was not significant, since an employer could escape its appli-
cation simply by refusing to submit authorization cards for independent
verification.
Two subsequent decisions, however, expanded the "independent
knowledge" test and thus diminished substantially an employer's ability
to assert a defense of "good faith" doubt of union majority status. In
Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.,'6 the employer's conversations with certain
pro-union employees and the presence of recognitional strikes were held
indicative of sufficient "independent knowledge" to support a bargain-
ing order. Similarly, independent knowledge was found in a second de-
cision arising from organizational activities by employees of the Wilder
Manufacturing Company,'1 the Board relying upon the presence of a
12. 158 N.L.R.B. at 1081, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
13. 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 49 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962).
14. Although the term "independent knowledge" does not appear in the Snow &
Sons opinion, the decision is continually cited as the source of this doctrine.
15. 134 N.L.R.B. at 710, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1228. See, e.g., Furr's, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B.
387, 61 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1966); Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185, 61 L.R.R.M. 1230
(1966); Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 861, 58 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1965); Kellog Mills,
147 N.L.R.B. 342, 56 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964).
16. 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1970). Circumstances found to indicate
"'independent knowledge" in this case included management's direct acknowledgment
to the union organizer that the signatures on all of the cards were genuine, manage-
ment's receipt of direct, oral expressions of support for the union from each of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, and a recognitional strike in support of the
union. Id. at 329-30, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
17. Wilder Mfg. Co, 185 N.L.RJB. 175, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1970). See note 21 infra.
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recognitional strike and an admission by one of the employer's officers
that a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit sup-
ported the union.
The progression of Snow & Sons, Aaron Brothers, Pacific Abrasive
Supply Co., and Wilder I indicated an inclination by the Board to
abandon the uncertainty and arbitrariness engendered by prior applica-
tion of the Joy Silk subjective test of good faith doubt and to place
determination of the validity of an employer's refusal to bargain on a
more objective plane. This trend was formally recognized when the
Board, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, announced "that
it had virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether." "8
In Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co.19 and a third Wilder
Manufacturing Co. decision,20 however, the Board abruptly reversed
this progressive trend in holding that voluntary agreement by an em-
ployer to abide by a third-party verification, as in Snow & Sons, is a
necessary predicate to invocation of the independent knowledge test
and removal of the good faith defense to a charge of refusal to bargain.
These cases subsequently were combined in the appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Truck Drivers Union.
The initial bargaining demand leading to the Wilder Manufacturing
Co. decisions21 was made in 1965 when the union presented to the em-
18. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).
19. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971), rev'd sub norn. Truck Drivers Union
Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3594 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974) (Nos. 73-1231 & 73-1234).
20. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972), reV'd sub nor. Truck Drivers
Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3594 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974) (Nos. 73-1231 & 73-1234). See note 21 infra.
21. A capsuled description of decisions arising out of the organizational activities
at the Wilder Manufacturing Company will facilitate the discussion to follow. In the
first decision in this series, 173 N.L.R.B. 214, 69 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1968), hereinafter re-
ferred to as Wilder 1, the Board held that there were no grounds for the issuance of
a bargaining order. In Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir.
1969), the case was remanded to the Board for reconsideration in light of the inter-
vening Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
The Board subsequently issued a supplemental decision and order reversing its former
position and holding in favor of the union. This decision, 185 N.L.R.B. 175, 75 L.R.R.M.
1023 (1970), will be referred to as Wilder 11. The employer petitioned for review
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, but, after transfer to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 454 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the case was
remanded to the Board for further reconsideration in light of its decision in
Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
The result of this review was another reversal of position by the Board, 198 N.L.R.B.
No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972), in what will be referred to as Wilder IL. The
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ployer signed authorization cards purportedly evidencing its support
among a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. When the com-
pany manager, having examined the cards, refused to recognize the
union as the employees' bargaining representative, a picket line was
established and maintained for eight months. In response to the em-
ployer's continued refusal to bargain, a complaint was filed with the
Board alleging violations of sections 8(a) (1)22 and 8(a) (5)23 of the Act.
The trial examiner, finding the employer had no good faith doubt of
union majority at the time the cards were presented, held that a duty
to bargain arose at that time.24 The Board, however, rejected these
findings, holding that the General Counsel had failed to establish the
employer's bad faith in rejecting the bargaining demand. Upon petition
for review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of the inter-
vening decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,25
stating: "[I]t would appear useful for the Board to look at this case
again not only in the light of what the Court decided in Gissel but also
by reference to what the Court said it understood the Board's practice
to be in situations not involving independent unfair labor practices but
where the employer stands upon a doubt as to the appropriateness of
the unit." 20
The Supreme Court in Gissel had decided several important questions
concerning the use of authorization cards to establish a union's majority
status. Referring to judicial interpretations of the National Labor Re-
lations Act and the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments,
the Court held that a duty to bargain could arise in the absence of a
Board-conducted election and that the Taft-Hartley amendments in-
dicated no congressional intent to change previous policy on this point.2 7
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Truck Drivers
Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3594 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974) (Nos. 73-1231 & 73-1234), reversing the Board decisions
in Linden Lwnber and Wilder III, was made more than eight years after the initial
demand for bargaining to the Wilder Manufacturing Company.
22. Section 8(a) (1) declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the [organizational and bar-
gaining] rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)
(1970).
23. Id. § 158(a) (5). See note 6 supra.
24. See Wilder Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 214, 221, 69 L.R.R.M. 1322, 1323 (1968).
25. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
26. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 635, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
27. 395 U.S. at 595-600.
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The Court further stated that, in light of the controls placed upon the
use of authorization cards and the methods employed to test their
validity, single-purpose cards28 are generally "reliable enough" to pro-
vide a valid route for establishing the majority status of a union .2
Finally, while reiterating that the Board is clothed with sufficient power
to issue a bargaining order to redress an employer's refusal to bargain,
the Court limited such relief to situations in which "an employer has
committed independent unfair labor practices which have made the
holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact undermined
a union's majority and caused an election to be set aside." 1o Although
the decision injected certainty into several areas of authorization card
use, it left unresolved the question which had been presented in tilder
I and which subsequently would arise in Linden Lumber, the Court
stating:
[W] e are not here faced with a situation where an employer, with
'good' or 'bad' subjective motivation, has rejected a card-based
bargaining request without good reason and has insisted that the
Union go to an election while at the same time refraining from
committing unfair labor practices that would tend to disturb the
'laboratory conditions' of that election. We thus need not decide
whether, absent election interference by an employer's unfair
labor practices, he may obtain an election only if he petitions for
one himself; whether, if he does not, he must bargain with a
card majority if the Union chooses not to seek an election; and
whether, in the latter situation, he is bound by the Board's ulti-
mate determination of the card results regardless of his earlier
good faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a Union-
sought election if he makes an affirmative showing of his positive
reasons for believing there is a representation dispute.31
28. Single-purpose authorization cards indicate the signers' intent to be represented
by a particular union. Dual-purpose cards, although evidencing employee desire for
union representation, predicate support for a particular union upon the results of an
election. Single-purpose cards, because they authorize a specific representative, gen-
erally are preferred by unions and management.
29. 395 U.S. at 601-10.
30. Id. at 610. The Court added that "under the Board's remedial power there is
still a third category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because
of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining
order. There is, the Board says, no per se rule that the commission of any unfair
practice will automatically result in a 5 8(a) (5) violation and the issuance of an order
to bargain." Id. at 615.
31. Id. at 601 n.18. The Court continued: "In short, a union's right to rely on
cards as a freely interchangeable substitute for elections where there has been no
[ l. 15:724
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Reconsidering on remand its decision in Wilder I in light of Gissel,
the Board reversed the order in favor of the employer, basing its deci-
sion upon a finding that the employer had gained "independent knowl-
edge" of the union's majority status as a result of its examination of the
authorization cards.3 2 The Board also noted the paucity of evidence
that the employer was willing to resolve any doubts it may have had
concerning the purported union majority and suggested that the em-
ployer should have evidenced its "willingness" to utilize the Act's
election procedures either by filing an election petition itself or by
pressing the union to file: "In the interest of encouraging all parties to
avail themselves of our election procedures, we would not be inclined
to enter a bargaining order if, absent independent unfair labor prac-
tices, the record supported a finding that the Respondent had in good
faith indicated a willingness to utilize those procedures, since, as the
Supreme Court has said, a Board-conducted election is indeed the
'preferred route' for determining employee desires." 33 Finding evidence
of neither good faith nor willingness to proceed to an election, the
Board held that the employer's actions violated section 8(a) (5) and
issued a bargaining order. While a petition for enforcement was
pending, however, the Board made another abrupt reversal in policy.
Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 4 like Wilder, involved
an employer's refusal to bargain when confronted with an authoriza-
tion card majority. When, after the union filed an election petition,
the employer persisted in its rejection of union demands and asserted
that it would not bargain even after an election, the union withdrew
its request for an election and struck in support of its bargaining demand.
The Board rejected the trial examiner's determination that the com-
pany had violated section 8(a) (5), citing Gissel and holding that the
employer's violation of section 8(a) (3)35 in refusing to reinstate two
election interference is not put in issue here; we need only decide whether the cards
are reliable enough to support a bargaining order where a fair election probably could
not have been held, or where an election that was held was in fact set aside." id.
32. W1ilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 175, 176, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023, 1024 (1970), re-
imindcd on juris. grounds, 454 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. 185 N.L.R.B. at 176, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1024-25.
34. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971), rev'd sub norn. Truck Drivers Union
Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3594 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974) (Nos. 73-1231 & 73-1234).
35. Section 8(a) (3) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer .. . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
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of the strikers was not sufficiently serious to support a bargaining
order."6 Declining to "re-enter the 'good-faith'. thicket of Joy Silk" 17
and severely restricting the employer's duty to bargain on the basis of
authorization cards, the Board held that unless, as in Snow & Sons, an
employer has agreed to abide by an independent verification of ma-
jority status, the independent knowledge test could not be invoked as
the basis for a bargaining order.38
After its decision in Linden Lumber, the Board petitioned the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to have Wilder II re-
manded to it for reconsideration.39 Applying its recently announced
position, the Board again reversed itself, holding in Wilder III that a
bargaining order was improper because the employer had engaged in no
independent unfair labor practices and had neither attempted nor
agreed to determine majority status on the basis of the authorization
cards by independent means.40
Petitions for review of the Board decisions in Linden Lumber and
Wilder 111 were consolidated before the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413
v. NLRB.41 Holding that the Board erred in limiting the scope of the
independent knowledge test to the facts of Snow & Sons, the court sug-
gested that the position of the Board advanced in Linden Lumber and
Wilder III was inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. It was noted
that "[t] he abandonment of Wilder II means that even if an employer
acts in total disregard of 'convincing evidence of majority status,' he has
no duty to recognize a union," and that, under the Board's present posi-
tion, a duty to bargain "can only be triggered by [the employer's] own
permission, in allowing an impartial party to assess union strength." 42
Emphasizing the necessity of preventing "an employer's deliberate
flouting and disregard" of authorization cards, the court, in ordering
the Board to reconsider its position, observed: "If no 'independent
36. 190 N.L.R.B. at 719, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1307.
37. Id. at 721, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
38. Id. at 720-21,77 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
39. The Board's petition for remand was considered together with the employer's
objections to jurisdiction. The case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 454 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which subsequently remanded it to the
Board.
40. Wilder Mfg. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1040 (1972).
41. 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Apr. 22,
1974) (Nos. 73-1231 & 73-1234).
42. Id. at 1109.
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knowledge' or 'good faith' test is to be used by the Board, the employer
must be put to some other kind of test to evidence good faith." -1 The
court proposed that an employer be required to evidence its good faith
doubt with respect to a union's majority status by petitioning for a
Board-conducted election 44 and that an employer which failed to peti-
tion for a certification election would assume the risk that its "conduct
as a whole, in the context of 'convincing evidence of majority support,'
may be taken as a refusal to bargain." 45
The suggestion of the court in Truck Drivers Union that an employer
be required to petition for a representation election as evidence of its
good faith doubt whether to bargain with an asserted card-based ma-
jority, as well as the position of the Board in Linden Lumber permitting
an employer in "good faith" to refuse to bargain unless it had volun-
tarily agreed to an independent card check, would inject a degree of
certainty into authorization card use which in recent years has been
notably absent. It is submitted, however, that each of these tests
represents an unnecessary extreme.
Although petitioning for an election has always been a practical op-
tion for an employer faced with a card-based bargaining demand,46 a
rule requiring such a petition as an indicium of good faith would ad-
vance neither the best interests of the parties nor the policies of the
Act. Section 8(a) (5) mandates bargaining whenever the employees
have selected a representative pursuant to section 9 (a) .47 An employer's
43. Id. at 1113.
44. Id. at I111 n.47. Section 9(c) (1) (B) of the Act permits an employer con-
fronted with a representation claim to petition the Board to conduct an election.
That section provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor
organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the
representative defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and . . . shall provide for an ap-
propriate hearing upon due notice .... If the Board finds upon the record
of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B) (1970).
45. 487 F.2d at 1112.
46. See Hall & Court, Selecting a Union Representative: Managernent's Role, 26
OKLA. L. REV. 38 (1973).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides, in part, that "[representatives designated
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ... :'
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duty to bargain, however, depends not upon a mere assertion that a
particular union represents a majority of employees but upon the em-
ployer's knowledge of the union's majority status.48 Requiring that an
employer either bargain on the basis of an asserted card-based majority
or petition for an election would tend to make the use of authorization
cards a "freely interchangeable substitute for elections," 4 9 notwith-
standing that the Supreme Court has found the preferred means for
obtaining majority status to be the election process.5 0 While authoriza-
tion cards are "reliable enough" to support bargaining orders in some
circumstances, 51 their use as a basis for requiring affirmative employer
action either in bargaining or in seeking a representation election should
be carefully circumscribed.
The proposal of the court in Truck Drivers Union places employers
on a narrow tightrope, since a petition for an election when the union
does not, in fact, have sufficient support to warrant such an election
may violate section 8(a) (2), which forbids employer aid to unions.2
Even more troublesome is the possibility that an employer, fully con-
fident that a union has majority support among employees in the bar-
gaining unit, could refuse to bargain, petition for an election, and
attempt during the period preceding the election to dissipate that ma-
jority. Were the mere filing of an election petition deemed to estab-
lish an employer's good faith, it would seem that the employer would
have a valid defense to a section 8(a) (5) charge based on its refusal
to bargain, notwithstanding its knowledge of the union's majority
status. Conceivably, the Board might become involved in questions
whether an employer's petition was filed in "good faith," which would
entail all the problems associated with administration of the Joy Silk
rule.
Finally, requiring that an employer, in certain circumstances, file an
election petition would curtail the employer's rights in relation
to the electoral process, since an employer filing a section 9(c) (1) (B)
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F.2d 753, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1940);
Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R3. 626, 1 L.R.R.M. 88 (1937).
49. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 601 n.18 (1969).
50. Id. at 596.
51. The Supreme Court noted in Gissel that authorization cards, "though admittedly
inferior to the election process, reflect employee sentiment when [the election) process
has been impeded ... ." Id. at 603.
52. Section 8(a) (2) declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or contribute financial or other support to it ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (2) (1970).
[Vol. 15:724
AUTHORIZATION CARDS
petition must define the appropriate bargaining unit and is precluded
from requesting a hearing on this matter.5 3 Although the court in
Truck Drivers Union argued this limitation on employer rights in sup-
port of its proposal as an expediting factor,54 it is submitted that the
election process should be viewed as a means for careful and ultimate
determination of the right of employees under section 7 of the Act
either to join or refrain from joining a union, 5 rather than a sporting
contest between employer and union. The employer should be entitled
to make certain valid objections; those which are frivolous or intended
merely to delay are subject to dismissal at the discretion of the regional
director.56 While expedience certainly is an important consideration,
it should not be permitted to override protection of employer rights
in the election process.
The position of the Board in Linden Lumber and Wilder III, on the
other hand, permitting an employer, in the absence of a voluntary agree-
ment to abide by third party verification of authorization cards, to
refuse to bargain regardless of other circumstances, appears overly re-
strictive. Under this rule silence becomes virtue, the employer being
able by inaction simply to disregard a presentation of authorization
cards. Moreover, if the union then proceeds to an election, the em-
ployer could, frequently with impunity, deny its employees' rights to
representation by interfering with the election through conduct which,
while violative of the Act, is not sufficiently serious to support a bar-
gaining order. As a result, the use of authorization cards would decline
drastically, the Board and the courts being severely hampered in their
ability to remedy even clear instances of employer bad faith.
It is submitted that the Board, while avoiding determinations of sub-
jective motivation, could identify a number of factual patterns other
than agreement to third party verification of authorization cards from
53. See Comment, Employer Recognition of Unions on the Basis of Authorization
Cards: The "Independent Knowledge" Standard, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 314, 326 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Employer Recognition].
54. 487 F.2d at 1111-12. The court noted the statement in Employer Recognition,
supra note 53, at 325 n.48, that "an election contested through submission of objections
at a pre-election hearing is likely to take sixty to sLxty-three days between petition
and balloting, while a consent election, in which the hearing is waived, is likely to
take only twenty to twenty-three days." 487 F.2d at 1112 n.48.
55. Section 7 guarantees employees various rights to "self organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
56. See Employer Recognition, supra note 53, at 327.
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
which independent knowledge by an employer of union majority status
could be inferred.57 Such knowledge, the inference of which would
remove from the employer the defense of good faith doubt, might be
deemed to arise, for example, as a result of support for a union by
picketing and recognitional strikes or from statements by an employer
representative acknowledging majority support for the union. s Al-
though determining an employer's independent knowledge is more dif-
ficult than applying a strict per se rule like that suggested in Truck
Drivers Union, such inquiries are a proper function of the NLRB, since
"[o]ne of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to
have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute
made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the
complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration." 69
CONCLUSION
Although the mechanical proposals of the court in Truck Drivers
Union and of the Board in Linden Lumber and Wilder III would re-
move the necessity of establishing standards and determining violations
through case-by-case adjudication, each appears to entail significant
sacrifices of employer or employee rights in the process of selecting
collective bargaining representatives. The decisions of the Board in
Pacific Abrasive and Wilder 1 expanding the independent knowledge
test beyond the facts of Snow & Sons, on the other hand, suggest the
results which could flow from a concentrated effort to develop cer-
tainty in the use of authorization cards. Returning to the approach taken
57. Two commentators have rejected such an approach, stating:
There are so many variations on individual types of unfair labor practices,
and so many combinations thereof, that it would be virtually impossible
to foresee and set guidelines for all, or substantially all, types of employer
conduct. As soon as any such guidelines were established, new or different
combinations of unfair labor practices not covered thereby would surely
be committed. Labor relations, like life, "has relations not always capable
of division into inflexible compartments. The molds expand and shrink."
Doppelt & Ladd, Gissel Packing Company-The NLRB Applies The Standards, 49
Cm.-KExT L. Rnv. 161, 164 (1972) (footnote omitted).
58. See notes 16-17 supra & accompanying text. Although the court in Truck
Drivers Union suggested that employees may refuse to cross picket lines for a variety
of reasons and that recognitional strikes are inconclusive evidence of a union's support
among employees, 487 F.2d at 1110 n.44, it is submitted that such activities do indicate
majority support, the relative weight of which indications should be determined by the
Board.
59. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945).
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in these cases, the Board should carefully define the circumstances sur-
rounding a refusal to bargain with an asserted card-based majority from
which it will infer an employer's independent knowledge of the union's
majority status. As a result, employers would be provided definite
guidelines within which to operate when presented with a demand for
bargaining predicated upon authorization cards, while the rights of em-
ployers as well as employees in the selection of bargaining representa-
tives would be preserved.
